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Abstract
Electricity grid infrastructures provides valuable flexibility in power systems
with high shares of variable supply due to its ability to distribute low-cost
supply to load centers (spatial), in addition to interlinking a variety of sup-
ply and demand characteristics that potentially offset each others’ negative
impact on system balance (temporal). In this paper, we present a framework
to investigate the benefits of alternative flexibility providers, such as fast-
ramping gas turbines, hydropower and demand side management, by using a
generation and transmission capacity expansion planning model. We demon-
strate our findings with a multinational case study of the North Sea Offshore
Grid with an infrastructure typology from year 2016 and operational data for
year 2030 — considering a range of renewable capacity levels spanning from
0% to 100%. First, we show how different flexibility providers are allocated
geographically by the model. Second, operational cost savings are quantified
per incremental unit of flexible capacity. Finally, we present a way to rank
different flexibility providers by considering their marginal contribution to
aggregate cost savings, reduced CO2 emissions, and increased utilization of
renewable energy sources in the system. The Shapley Value from cooperative
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game theory allows us to assess the latter benefits accounting for all possible
sequences of technology deployment, in contrast to traditional approaches.
The presented framework could help to gain insights for energy policy designs
or risk assessments.
Keywords: Energy Policy, North Sea Offshore Grid, Power System
Flexibility, Renewable Integration, Shapley Value, Transmission Expansion
Planning
1. Introduction
The European power system is exposed to large-scale integration of renew-
ables the coming decades (European Commission, 2011), demanding more
flexibility in order to distribute, consume, or store variable levels of power
feed-in (Auer and Haas, 2016). An adequate grid infrastructure can con-
tribute with spatial flexibility by distributing power surpluses over larger
geographical areas, which in turn connects the variable generation to dis-
tant load centers and potential energy storage (temporal flexibility) reducing
system imbalances (Lund et al., 2015). Hence, increased flexibility in both
space (spatial) and time (temporal) could be achieved with grid expansion.
In addition to a more efficient use of clean resources and decreased green
house gas (GHG) emissions, this is the reason why the North Sea Offshore
Grid (NSOG) has been identified by the EU Commission as one of the strate-
gic trans-European energy infrastructure priorities in the EU Regulation No
347/2013. Potentially serving the twofold purpose of integrating offshore
wind power generation while, at the same time, facilitating for increased
cross-border trade.
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Spatial and temporal flexibility are a key elements to maintain security
of supply and ensuring cost-efficient utilization of variable renewable energy
sources (VRES) feed-in (Cochran et al., 2014). More electricity grid is needed
in order to reach future energy- and climate targets and ENTSO-E estimates
e150bn worth of pan-European energy infrastructure investments the next
decade, with current supply and demand projections. A large share these
investments comprise multinational electricity grid expansion (ENTSO-E,
2016). One of the main challenges when it comes to planning for such invest-
ments is the geographical span that needs to be considered (Lumbreras and
Ramos, 2016). That is, by connecting larger geographical areas through an
infrastructure means that multivariate characteristics from multiple coun-
tries, with their respective supply- and demand mix, has to be accounted
for in order to capture underlying values of larger system dynamics. For in-
stance, the synergy value of VRES, such as offshore wind in the coastal areas
of Great Britain, and energy storage facilities, such as hydropower located
in the Norwegian mountains (Huertas-Hernando et al., 2017).
The geographical span does not only affect the computational complexity
in long-term planning models, but it also induces tighter market integration
between countries. When building a new, or expanding an old, transmission
corridor — price effects will occur at adjacent connection points (Hogan,
2011). These adjacent points are, in our case, countries that experience a
change in welfare, i.e. consumer surplus and producer surplus. In turn,
this might lead to impact on neighbouring regions or countries as shown in
(Sauma and Oren, 2007) focusing on distributional effects of transmission
expansion. In Egerer et al. (2013) they study the welfare implications of
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grid expansion in the NSOG. Other similar studies, but in context of renew-
able portfolio standards, includes an assessment of the Western Electricity
Coordinating Council (WECC) in the US (Perez et al., 2016).
Evaluating the need for, and impact of, flexibility options is thus a com-
plex task considering the size and dynamics of a power system, and its eco-
nomic implications. Moreover, as technology matures and costs decreases,
other flexibility options might evolve as cost competitive compared with grid
expansion. Hence, there is an uncertainty element that should be incor-
porated when assessing the added value of flexibility sources over a long
economic lifetime (Konstantelos and Strbac, 2015). For instance, the de-
ployment sequence of different flexibility providers might have an economic
impact on previous, and future, deployments of other technologies.
This paper presents a generic framework for geographical- and economic
evaluation of flexibility options. We use a generation and transmission expan-
sion planning (GTEP) model and leverage methods from cooperative game
theory (Ferguson, 2014) in order to cope with the aforementioned context.
More precisely, we exploit the properties of The Shapley Value (SV) (Lloyd
S. Shapley, 1953) in order to account for different deployment sequences and,
consequently, use this information to assess the contribution from each flex-
ibility provider to system benefits. To this end, we are able to somewhat
account for future uncertainty in, e.g., innovation and deployment sequence
without the need of sophisticated, stochastic programming tools. However,
we do not claim that the presented approach is a substitute for the latter
— rather a complement. We demonstrate the added value in terms of more
insights to the problem at hand.
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The remaining parts of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
overviews existing literature on how to quantify the need for system flexi-
bility and its contributions on system level, extended with recent work on
cooperative game theory for power system applications. Section 3 presents
the GTEP expansion planning model, case study setup, and a brief introduc-
tion on how the SV is calculated. Finally, results from the NSOG case study
is presented in Section 4 followed by a conclusion with recommendations for
future work in Section 5.
2. Literature
This section overviews existing literature and power system flexibility
analyses, with a particular focus on long-term planning models that are used
for GTEP. Together with a review on relevant applications of cooperative
game theory, we derive our contributions in the end of the section.
2.1. Long-term planning models and flexibility analysis
As already mentioned in the introduction, novel GTEP models has to
incorporate a significant level of details in order to account for current and
future market characteristics. At the same time, they have to include larger
geographical areas as discussed in prominent TEP reviewes by Lumbreras
and Ramos (2016) and, with a focus on multinational offshore grids like the
NSOG by Gorenstein Dedecca and Hakvoort (2016). It has been shown that
there is an underlying value in capturing system dynamics over larger areas
due to smoothing effects (Hasche, 2010). For instance, by aggregating VRES
generation over a larger geographical area the net feed-in on system level
tends to be smoother than for smaller areas due to weather variations. This
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effect could offset some need for flexibility, at least temporal, whereas spatial
flexibility has to be in place in order to link those interdependencies.
Moreover, the material price impact of lumpy grid investments creates
incentives for generators to respond with changes in their generation mix
due to potential price arbitrage (Hogan, 2011), meaning that cost-efficient
equilibria are not met if not considering both transmission and generation
expansion due to its synergies on cost recovery (Munoz et al., 2012). Other
challenges in the GTEP literature include, but is not limited to, incorpora-
tion of uncertainty (Munoz et al., 2014), representation of loop flows (O’Neill
et al., 2011), distributed generation, demand side management, detailed en-
ergy storage handling, and FACTS devices (Hemmati et al., 2013). The main
challenge is that operational details comes with an expense of the larger and
more complex optimization programs, consequently leading to mathematical
difficulties such as non-convexity and intractable models.
Flexibility is referred to as the key term of the future by Auer and Haas
(2016) and has received increasing attention over the last years. One occur-
ring topic is the mapping of different metrics to quantify the level of flexibility
in a power system (Electric Power Research Institute, 2014). High-level met-
rics such as peak demand, regional grid strength, interconnections with other
areas, the number of power markets, and the generation mix are identified as
the most important ones (Cochran et al., 2014). Subsequently, this could be
broken down to individual flexibility providers such as demand side manage-
ment (DSM), fast-ramping generators, or energy storage. A comprehensive
review of different technologies and strategies is presented in (Lund et al.,
2015).
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The most prominent contributor to a cost-efficient and reliable develop-
ment of the power system is grid expansion. This has been demonstrated for
the European case by Fu¨rsch et al. (2013). Moreover, Huber et al. (2014) has
investigated short-term aspects of flexibility on an hourly scale with different
levels of VRES and geographical span, concluding that flexibility needs are
smaller for interconnected, transnational power systems. The same concep-
tion of grid infrastructures being a significant contributor to the availabil-
ity of flexibility, both in temporal and spatial form, is shown by Lannoye
et al. (2015) using Insufficient Ramping Resource Expectation (IRRE) and
the Periods of Flexibility Deficit (PFD) as explanatory metrics. However,
uncertainty is left out of scope in the aforementioned literature.
Konstantelos and Strbac (2015) acknowledge that transmission grid in-
vestments are important for the future power system development, but ques-
tions its competitive edge compared with other flexible network technolo-
gies. They demonstrate the value of incorporating multiple flexibility op-
tions where costly grid reinforcements could be avoided, and that models
ignoring uncertainty could systematically undervalue benefits of flexibility
options. The approach of considering multiple options under uncertainty has
reached a consensus as one of the most frequent shortcomings in the existing
literature (Kondziella and Bruckner, 2016). The latter review paper high-
lights learning curves and innovation, where a majority of planning models,
especially static ones, might yield inefficient lock-in of established technol-
ogy options. In this paper, we will to some extent account for the reviewed
shortcomings, by utilizing a relatively simple approach compared to using,
e.g., a multi-stage stochastic program or robust optimization.
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2.2. Cooperative game theory in power system applications
Cooperative game theory has been used for various applications in power
systems and dates back to Hobbs and Kelly (1992) analyzing fair transmis-
sion pricing policies, followed by the first applications on transmission expan-
sion planning by Contreras and Wu (1999) calculating fair cost allocations.
Both papers applies The Shapley Value (Lloyd S. Shapley, 1953) in order to
find fair solutions with respect to marginal contributions from each player
entering full cooperation (grand coalition), in all possible sequences, for a
N-player game. Other applications in power systems include the allocation
of firm energy rights among hydro plants (Faria et al., 2009) and benefit-
based expansion cost allocation in context of renewable integration (Hasan
et al., 2014). All with players whose incentives are to maximize their own
payoff, which is somewhat different from our approach viewing players as
technologies (flexibility options) under multinational welfare maximization.
In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of applications in
distribution systems. For instance, profit allocations among distributed en-
ergy sources acting as virtual power plants (Dabbagh and Sheikh-El-Eslami,
2015), remuneration to participants in demand response programs (O’Brien
et al., 2015), or for calculating fair allocations of costs and benefits among mi-
crogrid agents (Lo Prete and Hobbs, 2016). Still, no applications considering
flexibility technologies.
Banez-Chicharro et al. (2017b,a) views transmission projects as players
using an extension of the SV approach, called Aumann-Shapley (AS). The
main difference between the SV and AS is that the latter accounts for frac-
tional contributions from different players, in addition to being easily scalable
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to larger problems (Junqueira et al., 2007). Although computational efforts
is not an issue in this paper, there are other properties of AS that might be
beneficial for studies like the one presented in this paper. We will discuss
this later.
2.3. Contributions
We extend the reviewed literature by applying SV in context of power
system flexibility analysis, defining flexibility providers as players in a N-
person cooperative game. Moreover, our generic step-by-step approach is
demonstrated with a North Sea Offshore Grid case study highlighting the
added value and insights that could be gained. This with limited information
about future costs and decision support tools that easily could be solved with
off-the-shelf software. Hence, our contribution is two-folded:
1. Present an approach for a comparative analysis of different levels of
VRES, while maintaining consistent capacity- and energy levels in the
system.
2. Apply the SV from cooperative game theory in order to evaluate the
competitive edge of transmission capacity as a flexibility provider, com-
pared with other potential flexibility options.
This means that we also are able to cope with some of the most frequent
shortcomings in the existing literature. That is, present alternative ways to
account for uncertainty in learning and innovation, using a GTEP model
that incorporates multivariate correlations in load and variable generation as
opposed to static models (Kondziella and Bruckner, 2016).
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3. Methodology
To carry out the evaluation of different flexibility options we use a GTEP
model (PowerGIM). In turn, we use results from this model in order to calcu-
late the SV. The GTEP model is based an extension of the planning models in
(Tro¨tscher and Korp˚as, 2011) and more recently (Kristiansen et al., 2017b),
which is available online in the same git repository as the pan-European
market simulator; PowerGAMA (Svendsen and Spro, 2016). A list of nota-
tions for the GTEP model presented in following subsections can be found
in Appendix A.
Figure 1: Base case for North Sea grid infrastructure (year 2016). Demand and generation
capacities are given for year 2030 (ENTSO-E, 2014).
3.1. Generation and transmission expansion planning model
The mathematical formulation, (1a)-(1k), is adapted to the 25-bus NSOG
case study comprising six countries in total, namely; Norway (NO), Den-
mark (DK), Germany (DE), The Netherlands (NL), Belgium (BE), and Great
Britain (GB), as depicted in Figure 1.
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The model originates from a bi-level structure where generators respond
to transmission investments. Due to assumptions of perfect competition,
inelastic demand and a welfare maximizing transmission infrastructure in-
vestor, we can recast this bi-level equilibrium model as an optimization pro-
gram that co-optimize both investment- (IC) and operational costs (OC)
(Samuelson, 1952). In turn, we assume that investment costs (1b) and market
operation (1c) reach cost-efficient equilibrium by minimizing the net present
value (NPV) of total system costs (1a) measured in e. Operational costs are
calculated for one representative year, multiplied with an annuity factor a in
order to convert annual costs to NPV.
min
x,y,z,g,f,s
IC + a ·OC (1a)
where
IC =
∑
b∈B
(Cfixb y
num
b + C
var
b y
cap
b ) +
∑
n∈N
CZnzn +
∑
i∈G
CXixi (1b)
OC =
∑
t∈T
ωt(
∑
i∈G
(MCi + CO2i)git +
∑
n∈N
V OLLsnt) (1c)
Cfixb = B +B
dDb + 2CSb ∀b ∈ B (1d)
Cvarb = B
dpDb + 2CS
p
b ∀b ∈ B (1e)
subject to∑
i∈Gn
git +
∑
b∈Binn
fbt(1− lb)−
∑
b∈Boutn
fbt + snt =
∑
l∈Ln
Dlt ∀n, t ∈ N,T (1f)
Pmini ≤ git ≤ γit(P ei + xi) ∀i, t ∈ G,T (1g)∑
t∈T
ωtgit ≤ Ei ∀i ∈ G (1h)
− (P eb + ycapb ) ≤ fbt ≤ (P eb + ycapb ) ∀b, t ∈ B, T (1i)
ycapb ≤ Pn,maxb ynumb ∀b ∈ B (1j)∑
b∈Bn
ynumb ≤Mzn ∀n ∈ N (1k)
xi, y
cap
b , git, snt ∈ R+, fbt ∈ R, ynumb ∈ Z+, zn ∈ {0, 1}
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The GTEP model is targeted for system characteristics in the North Sea
region where both offshore grid technology costs and hydro representation
plays an important role. Equations (1d) and (1e) represents the fixed- and
variable cost functions, respectively, incorporating distance and power rating,
denoted d and p, in addition to end-point switch-gear costs, CS. The fixed
costs, Cfixb , are multiplied with the number of new cables, y
num
b , and the
variable costs, Cvarb , with the accumulated new cable capacity, y
cap
b , as shown
by (1b). Moreover, in cases where new nodes, e.g. offshore platforms, needs
to be installed we use a binary variable, zn, that is enforced by new cables
connected to this node (1k). Finally, generation expansion is represented
by continuous variables, xi, which all together with operational variables for
generation, git, branch flow, fbt, and load shedding, snt, yield a mixed-integer
linear program (MILP).
We ignore Kirchhoff’s voltage law (KVL) since a majority of the system
infrastructure consists of high voltage direct current (HVDC) branches that
are fully controllable. This results in a transport model with no loop-flows
(1i). However, linear losses are incorporated to reflect both the transmission
distance and use of necessary voltage transformers and power electronics, as
seen from the nodal energy balance (1f), i.e. Kirchhoff’s current law (KCL).
The nodal energy balance (1f) ensures that demand is met by the sum of
generation, power flow, and/or load shedding, in each country. Hence, input
data is given at national level using a discount rate amounting to 5% and an
economic lifetime spanning 30 years (ENTSO-E, 2014).
The variability of wind, solar, hydropower, and load is incorporated us-
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ing full-year, hourly profiles from both historical data and numerical weather
data, where the latter source is particularly relevant for offshore coordinates
with limited historical data (Kristiansen et al., 2016). The hourly profiles
are reflected in (1g) with a factor, γit, ranging from 0 to 1 inflow/availability
and multiplied with the maximum existing capacity, P ei , plus any additional
capacity investments, xi. We use agglomerative hierarchical clustering tech-
nique in order to reduce the hourly time series from 8760 hours to 8760/24
= 548 hours, while still maintaining a relatively high level of multivariate
correlations between the time series and between the different geographical
coordinates (Ha¨rtel et al., 2017; Kristiansen et al., 2017a). This improves the
models ability to capture underlying values of smoothing effects and variable
flow patterns at system level.
3.2. Varying the share of renewables from 0% to 100%
All flexibility options are evaluated under different shares of renewable
capacity. The base case renewable capacity is given by ENTSO-E Vision
4 (ENTSO-E, 2014), i.e. 100% VRES will be equivalent to this data set.
For 0% VRES, the base case VRES capacity is allocated over to a fictive
RES-thermal generator restricted by yearly energy inflow (1h) corresponding
to the capacity-weighted average of all VRES inflow (yielding an average
utilization factor 0.34); offshore wind, onshore wind, and solar PV. Hence,
the available capacity and yearly energy inflow is about the same for all
cases with VRES capacity ranging from 0-100%. Moreover, RES-thermal
capacity operates with a marginal cost (37.30 e/MWh on average) and CO2
emission rate (0.31 tonCO2/MWhe on average) equal to the most expensive
thermal generator in each country. The latter approach is used to reflect
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the operational costs of switching a share of the peak (thermal) capacity mix
from dispatchable to variable, utilizing the merit-order effect in each country.
3.3. Incorporating multiple flexibility options
The following assertions describes the different case studies. Each case
study is ran with the GTEP model including, and excluding, the option to
invest in new capacity under a varying share of VRES capacity as discussed
in the previous subsection. This means that each level of VRES is evaluated
with, and without, the option to invest in additional capacity. Moreover,
investment costs are set to zero, meaning that the marginal impact on system
operation does not reflect investment costs, but could rather be viewed as
break-even thresholds. Hence, our approach is independent of capital cost
data.
1. Grid: Grid investments are the only options that increase avialabil-
ity of both temporal and spatial flexibility, simultaneously, among the
considered alternatives. We allow radial typologies for offshore HVDC
interconnectors, and onshore AC grid reinforcements. Capacities to
offshore wind nodes are kept fixed at a high level in order to isolate
those from the analysis.
2. Gas CCS: Fast-ramping gas units with carbon capture and storage
(CCS) technology can be utilized to balance out the increasing mis-
match between VRES power feed-in and demand. We assume that the
generators are available at full capacity, all hours during the year.
3. DSM: Demand side management (DSM) is simply included as gener-
ation capacity at a marginal cost equivalent to the levelized costs of
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saved energy (LCSE), approximately 45 e/MWh (Ian Hoffman et al.,
2015). The maximum capacity of this flexible load is restricted to 10%
of the average load for a given country over a full year. 1 Hence, only
a small portion of the total load is assumed to be flexible, while the
rest of the load can be curtailed at a price ceiling amounting to 1000
e/MWh (VOLL).
4. Hydro: We disregard pumping in this case study, meaning that we can
only invest in additional hydropower production capacity. Additional
capacity is restricted to 10% of the capacity provided by Vision 4, and
the yearly utilization is restricted to 50% where we use time-series to
reflect the seasonal variation in water value (i.e. marginal costs). 2
Note that Norway is the only country that possess any considerable
amount of hydro in this data set.
5. Combined: The aforementioned options (1-4) are included in groups,
or all together. The GTEP model expands the most cost-efficient op-
tion(s), accounting for both spatial- and temporal benefits. The case
when all options are considered together represents what is referred to
as the grand coalition in cooperative game theory. The SV will account
for all possible ways to reach this grand coalition.
1Applications of DSM is expected to reduce peak load with 13% and, if combined
with demand response (DR), its potential increases to 17.4% in year 2020 (Moura and
de Almeida, 2010). This corresponds to 10.3% reduction in yearly energy consumption.
2The capacity expansion potential and yearly energy disposal are based on data from
ENTSO-E Vision 4 (ENTSO-E, 2014), in addition to an assessment of Norway as a green
battery in 2030 (Grøv et al., 2011), studying the potential for hydropower expansion.
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3.4. The Shapley Value
The SV is a method that calculates allocations of costs or benefits that
are considered to be fair for cooperative solutions. A famous example is
The Airport Game (Littlechild and Owen, 1973) where the SV is used to
calculate a fair airfield maintenance fee to airplanes of different sizes, i, since
each airplane has different impact on airfield requirements and maintenance
cost. Another example is The Bankruptcy Game (O’Neill, 1982) where a
small company owes money to creditors, i, but the remaining assets cannot
cover the total debt. Here, the SV is used to find a fair allocation of debt
payback to creditors, considering the average value of all possible paybacks
to creditors with remaining company values.
In this paper, we think of different flexibility providers as players, i, and
assess their contribution towards a solution where all technologies are de-
ployed in the power system. To this end, the SV will account for differ-
ent sequences in which technologies are deployed, which makes sense from
a perspective of uncertainty regarding learning and innovation, as well as
lead-time. For instance, some technologies (e.g. grid) might require a longer
lead-time from day of decision to day of operation, compared to other al-
ternatives (e.g. gas plants). The SV for a given technology, i, is shown in
Equation (2).
φi(N, v) =
1
|N |!
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(|N | − |S| − 1)![v(S ∪ i)− v(S)] (2)
The characteristic functions v(·) in Equation (2) are collected for each
possible combination of flexibility options from the GTEP model. The pro-
cedure for calculating the SV is; weight different ways where technology i can
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add value to a combination of technologies S, which is a subset of all tech-
nologies N (grand coalition). This captures the marginal contributions from
technology i for different sequences, [v(S ∪ i) − v(S)], weighted by the |S|!
different ways the combination S could have been formed prior to technology
i joining it and by the (|N |− |S|− 1)! ways the remaining technologies could
join the same coalition, summed over all combinations of subsets excluding i
(S ⊆ N \ {i}) and averaged by dividing with |N |!, where |N |! is the number
off possible orderings of all technologies. The resulting payoff, in our case
contribution to system benefits, is given by φi(N, v) for each technology i.
This means that the GTEP model optimize expansion plans considering
availability of different flexibility options, individually (as i) and in combi-
nations with each other (as S or N). Another alternative is to let the GTEP
model decide which flexibility alternatives to invest in, in one run, equivalent
to the grand coalition, N , hereby referred to as the traditional approach.
The latter will differ from the SV since it ignores aspects of ordering and
technologies’ contribution to smaller subcoalitions, S ⊂ N .
Note that the GTEP model will expand bulky capacities of different flexi-
bility options, e.g. 1000 MW grid. This is where AS differs from SV, whereas
the former calculates the marginal contributions by uniformly increasing the
size of different flexibility providers from zero to its current value. For in-
stance, other flexibility options are included before grid reach a bulky value
of 1000 MW. However, since our GTEP model contains integer variables
we cannot exploit sensitivity information from its capacity constraints (dual
variables), which is necessary in order to use AS. One could, of course, relax
all integer variables in the GTEP model.
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3.5. Measuring the benefits of flexibility providers
Based on the case study setup presented in the previous subsections, we
quantify the benefits of different flexibility providers with the GTEP model.
This is done for different levels of VRES, ranging from 0-100%. The benefits
are simply measured in relation to the base case GTEP results, i.e. where
flexibility options are excluded. For instance, when considering the impact of
grid expansion, we simply calculate the difference from the base case, which
most likely involve higher operational costs due to grid congestion.
In the following results section we present i) the geographical need for
flexibility options, ii) the marginal value of each flexibility provider at sys-
tem level (cost savings per unit capacity), and iii), the accumulated system
benefits from each flexibility provider (total cost savings, emission reduc-
tions, VRES utilization). The latter is calculated in two ways; first with
respect to one GTEP optimization with all flexibility options available, and
second, calculating the SV based on 24 = 16 different GTEP optimizations,
i.e. different combinations (S ⊆ N) of the four flexibility providers.
4. Results
First, a brief discussion of the base case is presented, followed by our
findings on the metrics listed in the end of previous section.
4.1. Base case
The base cases comprise 0, 25, 50, 75, and 100% VRES excluding the
option to invest in flexibility. We use current grid typology from year 2016,
and generation and demand for 2030 (ENTSO-E, 2014), yielding inefficient
grid capacity. However, we allow for load shedding at VOLL e/MWh.
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With low shares renewables in the system, the supply mix is perfectly
able to balance with load due to the availability of RES-thermal, which is
more flexible than the original VRES capacity although the yearly energy
availability is approximately the same. However, RES-thermal can be dis-
patch freely over all hours, in contrast to VRES that is bounded by its energy
inflow (e.g. wind speed). There is zero load shedding in the system, but the
dispatch comprise of a more costly generation mix as well as high emission
levels in contrast to system operation with high levels of VRES.
For each base case with different shares of VRES, we consider all possible
flexibility options and quantify their impact on system operation, alone and in
combination with each other. For instance, if we allow for grid expansion, we
see that more grid is introduced as the share of renewables increase, yielding
lower average price levels and, at the same time, higher price volatility due
to more variable supply capacity. This is also in line with the reviewed
literature. However, note that grid will have a smoothing effect on price
variations, i.e. it is the level of VRES that is the main driver for price
volatility.
Throughout the remaining parts of this section the low- and high VRES
scenarios represents 25% and 100% VRES capacity, respectively, relative to
ENTSO-E Vision 4 (ENTSO-E, 2014).
4.2. Geographical spread of flexibility needs
Figure 2 illustrates how the flexibility needs are allocated by technology
and by country. The left part of the figure shows the allocation under low
shares of renewables where, for instance, interconnectors (i.e. cross-border)
grid expansion is allocated in larger portions to NO and GB (see upper left
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Figure 2: Relative capacity by technology (upper plots) and by country (lower plots) under
low share (left part) and high share (right part) of renewables. Relative values sums to
one. Input data from ENTSO-E Vision 4 (ENTSO-E, 2014).
plot) while a majority of total DSM capacity is deployed in DE, in addition
to hydropower and gas CCS. The upper right plot, i.e. with high share of
renewables, shows approximately the same capacity allocation to each coun-
try, although grid investments seems to be more evenly distributed between
countries bordering the northern part of the North Sea. The latter reflects
the need for a geographically interlinked system exploiting smoothing effects
and multivariate correlations in supply and demand.
Note that hydro stays about the same in both cases due to its resource
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restrictions (we assume that each country can only expand 10% of the given
capacity in Vision 4). Moreover, hydropower is not expanded at all in NO
due to its already high capacity surplus (52 GW) and cross-border trade
limitations (2.4 GW). Hence, grid would be the first priority from NO’s
perspective given the input data.
In order to get a full overview of the allocations in each case, i.e. for
low and high renewable shares, we need to also consider the relative capacity
allocation within a country. This is depicted in the lower part of Figure
2. One occurring observation for most countries is the shift from DSM and
gas CCS to grid expansion when the share of variable generation capacity
increase. A justification for this shift could be that grid provides both spatial
and temporal flexibility, as discussed earlier. The latter observation is most
significant for DK and yields higher availability of cost-efficient supply in the
system.
In summary, Figure 2 demonstrates that the geographical distribution
of different flexibility providers remains more or less stable when comparing
low- and high share of VRES. However, all countries weight their domestic
flexibility mix towards more grid when the share of VRES increases, which
is in line with the findings in, e.g., Lannoye et al. (2015).
4.3. Marginal value of each flexibility provider
Individual flexibility providers are assessed in a system context by quan-
tifying its marginal impact on operational costs, as shown in Figure 3. One
can see from the figure that the marginal value of gas CCS is declining for
increasing shares of variable generation capacity, substituted by an increas-
ing value tradeoffs with grid interconnections, and partly DSM. The latter
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Figure 3: The marginal value per unit capacity (me/MW) for each flexibility provider in
terms of operational cost savings at system level.
stays about constant at m0.9e/MW for all shares of renewable capacity in
the system, while the marginal value of grid interconnections increases with
almost 10%.
The most risky flexibility option seems to be gas CCS. Its relatively high
fuel cost makes it less competitive when low-cost VRES is introduced through
import from transmission corridors that are connected with, e.g., NO and
DK. As a result of grid expansion, the average price levels converge and
might drop below the marginal cost of gas CCS.
The marginal value of hydropower per capacity unit is naturally high due
to i) its limited expansion possibilities, both by region and by capacity (10%
of initial capacity levels), and ii), its low marginal costs which lies in the
”safe” region of the merit-order supply curve. However, the value decreases
significantly when additional VRES capacity is added to the system, since
the price volatility caused by solar and wind substitutes some hydropower
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generation (for instance during hours with very high wind- and solar feed-in,
in combination with low demand).
4.4. Aggregate contribution to system benefits
From previous subsections, we know that grid contributes the most to
operational cost savings at system level, due to its facilitation for other flexi-
bility providers and its positive correlations with increasing shares of VRES.
But what about its impact on CO2 emissions and utilization of power gener-
ation from VRES? The upper part of Figure 4 shows the added value for all
the aforementioned metrics, as a result of hydro, grid, gas CCS, and DSM.
Again, the left part represents low shares of VRES while the right part of
the figure depicts the case with high shares of VRES. As expected for the
high VRES case, the value added by grid expansion increases significantly
relative to its competing alternatives, not only for operational cost savings,
but also in terms of reduced emissions and increased utilization of VRES.
Gas CCS seems to provide a larger fraction of benefits at low levels of
renewables, probably due to its competitive marginal cost for peak genera-
tion. Moreover, it might even lead to decreased utilization of renewables in
high VRES scenario since its occurrence in one region might lead to imports
from another, where cheaper, fossil fueled generation supplies parts of the
exchanged capacity (from e.g. coal).
The lower two plots in Figure 4 shows the added value considering all
possible sequences of technology deployment, i.e. the SV. For instance, X
is deployed first, Y second, Z third, and R forth, where all four flexibility
providers are to be placed into different orders in an equivalent arrangement
as the four variables. This way of calculating a system contribution accounts
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Figure 4: Relative benefit contribution to the system in terms of cost savings, reduced
CO2 emissions, and increased utilization of renewable supply (reduced curtailment). The
upper two plots shows the implicit value added by each technology option (traditional ap-
porach), while the lower two plots shows the value added for a range of possible deployment
sequences (Shapley Value). Both for low- (left) and high (right) levels of VRES.
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Table 1: The difference between the traditional approach and the Shapley Value in Figure
4, measured in % deviation with respect to the traditional approach. A positive number
would imply that the Shapley Value suggests a higher level of contribution from a particular
flexibility provider. All numbers are based on the Low VRES case.
DSM Gas CCS Grid Hydropower
Cost savings 5.13% -8.42% 6.34% -3.06%
CO2 reductions 20.26% 7.51% -27.41% -0.36%
VRES utilization -4.91% -16.63% 21.77% -0.23%
for competitive advantages, which is particularly useful in cases where this
is highly uncertain. Moreover, it implies that one could account for some
uncertainty without relying on any sophisticated, stochastic optimization
programs, although a combination would probably generate more insights
and knowledge.
With the SV results in mind, one could argue that grid is even more
competitive with respect to most of the considered metrics for high shares of
VRES, no matter which technology gets deployed at what time. For instance,
if DSM is found profitable at an early stage, grid would still prove beneficial
despite its disadvantage in terms of longer lead time. However, the added
value of grid is harder to distinguish between traditional- (upper plots) and
the SV approach (lower plots) for low shares of VRES (left part of Figure
4), meaning that the competitive advantage is less significant for a future
with low shares of VRES. Table 1 summarize the main difference between
the SV- and traditional allocation for the low VRES scenario, where positive
numbers implies that SV values a given technology more than the traditional
approach.
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An interesting observation from Table 1 is that, when considering all pos-
sible sequences, grid expansion might actually yield increased CO2 emissions,
on average. For this case, it seems that coal units achieve higher utilization
when, for instance, gas CCS is deployed at an earlier stage than grid since
the marginal flexibility provider (gas) has a higher marginal cost than coal.
In other words, more grid allows for more coal export.
Again, from Figure 4 and Table 1, we see that gas CCS is very sensitive
to market characteristics although it can contribute with significant value in
some cases. Considering the possibility that other flexibility options might
be deployed, gas CCS seems less attractive due to risk of being on the margin
of the market clearing—potentially leading to stranded investments.
4.5. Discussion
Note that our goal is not to provide a detailed analysis of different flexi-
bility providers, but rather present a framework for how it can be done. The
results demonstrate that insights could be gained regarding the geographi-
cal demand for different flexibility technologies, their contribution to system
benefits, and a benchmark for their contributions considering uncertainty in
sequence of deployment (the SV). These insights could be useful for analysts
and policy makers for identifying robust investments and energy policies.
Although the analysis relies on simplifications in operational details it
does, however, reproduce similar observations found in the existing literature.
For instance, grid expansion is shown to be the most prominent option due to
its facilitation for increased availability of spatial flexibility, and consequently
temporal flexibility from other providers that are geographically spread. In
turn, this yields a positive impact on utilization of VRES and, through a more
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cost-efficient operation, also system cost savings. Moreover, by exploiting the
properties of the SV, we can augment to the claim of grid being the most
robust flexibility provider.
5. Conclusion
This paper presents an alternative way to perform an engineering-economic
analysis of power system flexibility over a range of variable renewable energy
source (VRES) capacity levels, ranging from 0-100% of the 2030 scenario
”Vision 4” by ENTSO-E. The use of a fictive thermal unit allow us to ap-
proximate availability of both capacity and yearly energy inflow over this
range of VRES capacities, yielding more reliable analyses for comparison. We
evaluate all scenarios with a generation and transmission expansion planning
(GTEP) model in order to assess individual, and combinations of, flexibility
providers such as Demand Side Management (DSM), Gas CCS, Hydropower,
and high-voltage cross-border transmission grid (Interconnectors).
We demonstrate our results with a North Sea Offshore Grid case study,
discussing the geographical distribution of flexibility needs both by capacity
allocation to individual countries and by capacity within each country. That
is, how much DSM is deployed in country X, and at what share does DSM
represent the capacity mix within country X. This allows us to assess where
different types of flexibility options are most cost efficient.
In addition, we quantify the marginal value of each flexibility alternative
in terms of operational cost savings (e/MW). We ignore investment costs,
meaning that the resulting values can be regarded as break-even thresh-
olds. Moreover, the relative impact on operational cost savings, reduced
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CO2 emissions, and increased utilization of power generation from VRES
are illustrated in relative terms, for each alternative. We apply the Shapley
Value from cooperative game theory in order to analyze the latter impact
incorporating all possible deployment sequences. The Shapley Value does,
for instance, implicitly account for the disadvantages of long lead time or the
advantage of learning rate, e.g. the long lead time of grid investments and
future cost-efficient DSM solutions, respectively.
The authors acknowledge the low level of details in the model used to
quantify those benefits, which is why this work can be viewed as a generic
framework to do equivalent analyses. This framework could easily be repro-
duced with more detailed planning models or market simulators, incorpo-
rating a proper representation of unit commitment, storage, and load flow
equations. An interesting extension of this work could be to use a stochastic
model to calculate characteristic functions for the Shapley Value, and com-
pare this with the deterministic one. This could give an idea about the level
of uncertainty that Shapley Value mange to incorporate in its combinatorial
calculation scheme.
Other interesting extensions includes dynamic investment models. In
this paper, we incorporate different sequences for deployment but ignore the
discounted monetary value with respect to the time between different de-
ployments. Moreover, marginal contributions calculated with SV are based
on bulky capacity investments. This means that each technology is not de-
ployed partially, but in full scale determined by the expansion model. With
Aumann-Shapley (AS), it is possible to capture the marginal contribution at
fractional levels. Hence a comparison of SV and AS would be interesting both
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from a computational perspective and in terms of the resulting allocations.
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Appendix A. Notations for GTEP model (PowerGIM)
Table A.2: Notations for the generation and transmission expansion planning model.
Sets
n ∈ N : nodes
i ∈ G : generators
b ∈ B : branches
l ∈ L : loads, demand, consumers
t ∈ T : time steps, hour
i ∈ Gn, l ∈ Ln : generators/load at node n
n ∈ Binn , Boutn : branch in/out at node n
Parameters
a, ωt : factors for annuity and samplesize hour t [h]
V OLL : value of lost load (cost of load shedding) [e/MWh]
MCi : marginal cost of generation, generator i [e/MWh]
CO2i : CO2 emission costs, generator i [e/MWh]
Dlt : demand at load l, hour t [MW]
Cfixb , C
var
b : fixed- and variable capital costs, branch b [e, e/MW]
B,Bd, Bdp : branch mobilization, fixed- and variable cost [e,e/km,e/kmMW]
CSb, CS
p
b : onshore/offshore switchgear (fixed and variable cost), branch b [e,e/MW]
CXi : capital cost for generator capacity, generator i [e/MW]
CZn : onshore/offshore node costs (e.g. platform costs), node n [e]
Pmini , P
e
i : minimum and maximum existing generation capacity, generator i [MW]
γit : factor for available generator capacity, generator i, hour t
P eb , P
n,max
b : existing and maximum new branch capacity, branch b [MW]
Db : distance/length, branch b [km]
lb : transmission losses (fixed + variable w.r.t. distance), branch b
Ei : yearly disposable energy (e.g. energy storage), generator i [MWh]
M : a sufficiently large number
Primal variables
IC,OC : investment- and operational costs [e]
ynumb : number of new transmission lines/cables, branch b
ycapb : new transmission capacity, branch b [MW]
zn : new platform/station, node n
xi : new generation capacity, generator i [MW]
git : power generation dispatch, generator i, hour t [MW]
fbt : power flow, branch b, hour t [MW]
snt : load shedding, node n, hour t [MW]
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